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We use a new trade dataset showing that nineteenth century sub-
Saharan Africa experienced a terms of trade boom comparable to other 
parts of the “global periphery.” A sharp rise in export prices in the five 
decades before the scramble (1835–1885) was followed by an equally 
impressive decline during the colonial era. This study revises the view 
that the scramble for West Africa occurred when its major export 
markets were in decline and argues that the larger weight of West 
Africa in French imperial trade strengthened the rationale for French 
instead of British initiative in the conquest of the interior. 
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The scramble for Africa stands out as a remarkable feat of 
European imperialism and its motives and timing have been long 
debated (Pakenham 1992, p. xxi–xxii). In less than two decades 
(1884–1898), the lion’s share of the vast African continent was 
partitioned among a handful of European powers. To be sure, the 
string of coastal settlements that had been established in support of 
the trade in slaves, gold, ivory, and other tropical products, testified 
to European encroachment for centuries. The Cape settlement had 
functioned as a provisioning station for the trade with Asia already 
since 1652. The conquest of Algiers in 1830 already demonstrated a 
French ambition to create an imperial “backyard” across the 
Mediterranean. French and British interference in Egyptian affairs in 
the early 1880s also had a clear objective: they guaranteed European 
control over the Suez and secured the interests of European investors 
in Egyptian bonds.1 But the lures of power and profit were far less 
obvious in the vast sub-Saharan African interior, and the costs of 
permanent colonization were high.2 
 This article scrutinizes the economic motivations for the 
scramble of West Africa by zooming in on trade developments in sub-
Saharan Africa in the long nineteenth century, and by assessing these 
trade developments in a global comparative perspective. Our 
overarching argument is that trade developments from the mid-1830s 
to mid-1880s did more to strengthen the economic rationale for the 
scramble than most of the historical literature has hitherto assumed. 
This argument has two aspects.  
 The first aspect relates to the idea that African markets were 
too insignificant to lure major European powers into a large-scale 
military conquest anyway. This view has become mainstream through 
the influential work of Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher (1961), 
who argued that internal African political changes pulled Britain into 
the scramble to safeguard its geo-political interests, and which were 
focused on securing access to Asia, not to protect or enhance trade 
with Africa. This view has been extensively debated among historians 
in the wider context of finding a plausible hierarchy of explanations 
for the scramble (Hargreaves 1960; Pakenham 1992; Chamberlain 
                                                          
1 For a general discussion of Britain and the African partition, see Cain and Hopkins (1993, 
pp. 303–39); for the occupation of Egypt, see Hopkins (1986); for the occupation of Algeria, 
see Sessions (2011). 
2 Sub-Saharan Africa refers to the entire continental area south of the Sahara Desert. 
Throughout this article, we refer to territories with their original names (albeit assigned by 
Europeans) and provide modern country names in parentheses whenever we deem necessary 
for non-specialist readers to keep track. In addition, we provide a map in Appendix 1 which 
shows the colonial borders around 1914 for the whole of Africa. 
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2009) as well as British colonial expansion in general (Platt 1973; 
Fieldhouse 1973; Hyam 1976; Cain and Hopkins 1980).3  
 We show that British-African trade comprised a tiny share of 
total British imperial trade, but that the share of West African exports 
in total French imperial trade was significant and growing. Afro-
European trade patterns in the nineteenth century were thus consistent 
with the French initiative in 1879 to survey the possibilities of 
connecting the Middle Niger delta to their commercial entrepôts on 
the Senegalese coast. We will not claim that nineteenth century trade 
developments explain the scramble for West Africa for national 
political prestige, intra-European tensions, religious zeal and, indeed, 
internal African politics all played their part. What we argue is that 
during the nineteenth century the costs of colonial conquest were 
declining as a result of innovations in transportation, communication, 
military, and medical technology, while the revenues of legitimate 
commerce were rising, thus narrowing the gap between costs and 
benefits of colonization. The nineteenth century commodity export 
boom was crucial in shaping an economic context in which the 
partition of Africa became politically defensible. When analyzed in a 
global comparative perspective, the West African terms of trade boom 
was exceptionally steep in the five decades before the Berlin 
Conference (1884–1885).  
 The second aspect relates to the timing of the scramble. 
Instead of occurring in a period of declining export markets for 
African commodities, as Anthony Hopkins (1973, pp. 124–35) as well 
as David Eltis and Lawrence Jennings (1988, p. 942) have argued, we 
show that the relative prices of most West African tropical export 
commodities continued to rise up to the mid-1880s. Increasing 
relative prices between 1853 and 1885 accounted for one-third of the 
export value growth to Britain, and even 55 percent of the export 
value growth to France. Hopkins’ argument that the scramble was 
provoked by internal African conflicts emerging from a notable drop 
in the terms of trade after the 1860s, has been mainly informed by an 
analysis of British-African trade in palm oil (p. 133).4 We show that 
for the key commodities in French-African trade, in other words gum 
and groundnuts, there was no such decline. French plans to construct 
a railway into the West African interior were already circulating since 
the 1850s, and the eventual initiative to effectuate these plans was 
aided by a growing weight of Senegambia in French imperial trade. 
 This prolonged export boom must be considered in the wider 
context of what is now commonly referred to as the “commercial 
transition” from slave exports to commodity exports (Law 1995). 
Figure 1 illustrates this transition for West Africa. It shows that annual 
                                                          
3 See Ratcliffe (1981) for a discussion of the methodological problems inherent to historical 
research on the link between economics and the partition of Africa. 
4 See also Dike (1956). 
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nominal revenues from slave exports into the Atlantic economy—
excluding slaves traded within Africa—rose to a maximum in the era 
1760–1808, when the share of commodity trade was below 10 percent 
of total West African exports. However, commodity exports overtook 
slave exports in the 1830s, and around 1850 these reached a temporary 
peak comparable to the one in slave exports half a century earlier. By 
the 1880s the nominal value of commodity exports was clearly higher, 
and would never revert to eighteenth century revenue levels again.  
There is a clear temporal sequence in the “commercial 
transitions” across sub-Saharan Africa: it first occurred in West 
Africa, then in West-Central Africa, and finally in East Africa. The 
gradual abolition of the African slave trades and the transition to 
commodity exports halted the continuous drain on already-scarce 
labor and spurred land-extensive tropical agriculture engaging 
smallholder family farms, communal farms, and large estates.5 
Although these major shifts in African trade are all connected in a 
globalizing world economy, a comprehensive and comparative survey 
of Africa’s external commodity trade over the long nineteenth century 
does not exist yet. Inconsistent and incomplete primary sources have 
long hampered the construction of century-long time series on 
commodity trade. 
Figure 1 is constructed from a new dataset of African 
commodity trade which we introduce in this article. This dataset 
contains export and import prices, trade volumes, export composition, 
and net barter terms of trade (NBTT hereafter) from the British slave 
trade abolition (1807–1808) to the eve of WWII (1939). Our dataset 
is a major improvement over existing datasets in terms of its temporal 
and spatial coverage, the number of commodities included, and the 
disaggregated level of annual unit export price observations at the 
African coast. Our dataset focusses on the sea-bound trade of Africa, 
and primarily, though not exclusively, its trade with Europe. The 
biggest limitation of our dataset is that it excludes intra-African 
overland trade. 
 The onset of colonial rule deepened and diversified African 
specialization in tropical commodity exports. Colonial states took 
control over sea-bound trade by imposing tariffs and forced 
cultivation schemes of export crops, while levying trade and direct 
taxes to finance the project of colonial state formation (Frankema 
2011; Gardner 2012). During the Great Depression and especially 
WWII, colonial governments started to regulate African commodity 
trade through price controls and export monopolies maintained by 
marketing boards (Bauer 1956; Meredith 1986). Colonial rule also 
                                                          
5 The literature on the slave trades, the abolition, and the commercial transition is vast. See 
for general surveys of these developments, Austen (1979). For the Atlantic slave trade and 
the abolition, see Klein (2010); for the Indian Ocean slave trade, see Clarence-Smith (1989); 
for the commercial transition in West Africa, see Law (1993, 1995). 
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facilitated the construction of railways and related inflows of foreign 
capital, and led to profound changes in the governance of land and 
labor markets. Colonial regimes set out to abolish slavery, but 
replaced it by alternative forms of labor coercion on a significant scale 
(van Waijenburg 2015). The effects of opening up the African interior 
were hard to miss: between 1897 and 1913 the total value of sub-
Saharan African commodity exports rose by more than 150 percent, 
from about £71 million to about £184 million (Forbes-Munro 1976, 
p. 86). European colonization and African responses to new 
commercial opportunities thus accelerated the trend of nineteenth-
century commodity export growth and, at the same time, reduced 
Africa’s opportunities to escape the trap of primary commodity 
specialization during the prolonged terms of trade decline from 1885 
to 1939. 
 
THE COMMERCIAL TRANSITION 
 
The nineteenth century expansion of world trade was driven 
by three fundamental forces: a transport revolution, a liberal trade 
policy move in industrial Europe, and an acceleration in world GDP 
growth associated with the industrial revolution.6 New transportation 
and communication technologies such as railroads, steamships, the 
telegraph, and the invention of the refrigerator, helped integrate world 
commodity markets, lowered price gaps between exporters and 
importers, and fostered trade between the industrial “core” and the 
commodity-exporting “periphery.” Falling trade costs from all 
sources accounted for more than half of the trade boom between 1870 
and 1914, and probably accounted for even more than that before 
1870 when transport costs declined even more rapidly (Jacks, 
O’Rouke, and Williamson 2011, p. 529).7  
 The move by the European industrial core towards a more 
liberal commercial policy, a commitment to the gold standard, and 
probably imperialism itself all made additional contributions to the 
nineteenth-century world trade boom (Estevadeordal, Frantz, and 
Taylor 2003; Meissner 2005; Ferguson 2004; Mitchener and 
Weidenmier 2008). Rapid manufacturing productivity growth in the 
industrial core lowered supply costs and output prices, adding to the 
demand for inexpensive factory-made manufactures, and by doing so 
generated a soaring derived demand for raw materials, and industrial 
intermediates, like fuels, fibers, dyes, rubber, oils, fine woods, and 
metals. In the industrializing core, manufacturing growth outpaced 
GDP growth, and was reinforced by a high-income elasticity of 
demand for consumption goods such as meat, dairy products, dried 
                                                          
6 This section draws in part on Williamson (2011, Chapter 1). 
7 See for seminal studies on the relation between transport cost declines and nineteenth 
century growth of international trade: North (1958) and Harley (1988). 
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fruit, sugar, tobacco, tea, cocoa, and coffee. All of these forces 
produced a powerful, century-long terms of trade boom in the 
“peripheral” commodity exporters, as the prices of their imported 
manufactures fell and those of their commodity exports rose.8 Yet, 
even though trade made it possible for the periphery to share some of 
the fruits of the industrial revolution taking place in the core, 
globalization also fostered de-industrialization in the periphery so that 
income per capita growth rates diverged.9  
The transport and communication revolutions not only 
lowered trade costs, they also reduced the costs of military conquest 
and colonial control. New innovations in weapon technology (e.g., 
gun boat, maxim gun) enhanced European military superiority and 
major advances in medical knowledge (quinine) reduced the high 
mortality and morbidity rates of overseas expeditions, and made 
treatment of tropical diseases much more effective. Of course, this 
drop in the costs of conquest made the scramble for Africa feasible, 
but not necessarily desirable (Curtin 1989).  
Most of sub-Saharan Africa became part of the nineteenth-
century world trade boom by shifting from slave exports to the export 
of ivory, groundnuts, copra, palm oil, palm kernels, beeswax, gum, 
dyewoods, sugar, rubber, cotton, minerals, and precious stones. The 
British considered the promotion of “legitimate trade” as a 
cornerstone of their “civilization mission” and the related suppression 
of internal and external African slave trades.10 Hopkins (1973) has 
argued that the abolition of the external slave trade provoked a “crisis 
of adaptation” because some slave trading areas had more suitable 
environmental conditions to shift towards tropical commodity exports 
than others.11 Moreover, the production of agricultural cash-crops for 
export markets involved a different business model than the 
production of slaves. Whereas slave raiding demanded a military 
hierarchy to secure violence monopolies and distribute slave trade 
revenues, the production of agricultural commodities could be 
conducted as efficiently by large numbers of small farmers, as by 
large-scale producers employing slave labor, the former favoring a 
model of atomistic competition over state monopoly. According to 
Hopkins (1973, p. 124) the implications of the commercial transition 
                                                          
8 Only China and Cuba were exceptions, Williamson (2011, p. 236). 
9 See for case-studies on Mexico: Dobado, G´omez-Galvarriato, and Williamson (2008); 
India: Clingingsmith and Williamson (2008); Turkey: Pamuk and Williamson (2011); and 
Egypt: Panza and Williamson (2015). 
10 The idea was that slavery within Africa could only be abolished by developing viable 
economic alternatives. The famous Niger expedition of 1841, which ended in a complete 
failure, was motivated by precisely these two objectives: to conclude treaties with local 
African chiefs to end slavery, and to explore the possibilities for plantation agriculture along 
the Niger river. See Temperley (1991). 
11 See for further reflections on Hopkins’ “crisis of adaptation” thesis the various 
contributions to the volume edited by Law (1995), including his introduction to this volume 
(1995, pp. 1–31). 
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for the re-organization of markets marked the start of the “modern 
economic history” of West Africa, that is, the economic structures that 
emerged during the commercial transition were to exist up until the 
close of the colonial era (1973, p. 294). 
Later studies have emphasized that the commercial transition 
was more evolutionary than revolutionary, since adaptation in most 
cases did not produce a crisis.12 David Northrup (1976) has argued 
that palm oil exports in the Bight of Biafra rose together with slave 
exports in the early nineteenth century before replacing the latter.13 
The joint expansion was facilitated by the market networks (port 
facilities, merchant relations, credit instruments) that had evolved 
under the slave trade.14 Martin Lynn (1995, p. 59) has extended this 
argument noting that market entry in the palm oil trade remained 
controlled by existing rulers and merchant groups. Paul Lovejoy 
(2005, pp. 162–76) has argued that the abolition induced a 
reallocation of slaves for Atlantic markets towards local and trans-
Saharan markets and showed how plantation agriculture (e.g., cotton, 
indigo, grains) used large amounts of slave labor in the Sokoto 
Caliphate (part of present-day Northern Nigeria). Gareth Austin 
(1995, pp. 95–100; 2005, pp. 46–47), discussing the Asante 
monopolies on kola nut and gold production, has argued that the 
emergence of new African and Atlantic markets for respectively kola 
nuts exported to Hausaland (Northern Nigeria) and gold smoothed the 
transition in the Gold Coast area (Ghana). Susan Martin (2006, pp. 
189–90) and Robin Law (1995, p. 196) have pointed out that part of 
the evolutionary changes also occurred in the domain of household 
and gender relations. 
 The commercial transition in East Africa occurred later. 
Despite British treaties to curb the slave trade with the Sultan of 
Zanzibar in the 1820s and 1830s, slave exports into the wider Indian 
Ocean area expanded up to the last quarter of the nineteenth century, 
                                                          
12 See several contributions to the edited volume by Law (1995). See for a direct critique 
Hopkins (1968), Ajayi and Austen (1972, pp. 303–306), and Hopkins (1972) reply. The case 
of Dahomey may still be seen as an example of a crisis of adaptation, with slave exports 
collapsing in the 1830s to 1850s, while palm oil exports were slow to pick up. See Manning 
(1982, p. 332).  
13 This also ties into the question as to the extent to which the growth of the Atlantic slave 
trade in the long eighteenth century had “crowded out” commodity exports, or instead had 
stimulated production of tropical crops for Atlantic markets in the wake of expanding 
commercial infrastructure and related (financial) institutional developments. This remains a 
contested topic in terms of both theoretical viewpoints (in other words Marxist versus 
Smithian interpretations) as well as interpretations of the empirical evidence. See for Marxist 
views Rodney (1972); Inikori (2002). See for a Smithian perspective, Thornton (1998).  
14 Gemery, Hogendorn, and Johnson (1990, pp. 163–64) argue on the basis of British custom 
ledgers that British non-slave imports from Africa increased fivefold during the eighteenth 
century. Eltis (2013, pp. 31–33), on the other hand, has estimated that the annual value of 
commodity exports was rather volatile, but overall hardly grew between 1700 and 1800, 
while its share of total exports collapsed from circa 41 percent to 7 percent. See also Doorn, 
Lindblad, and Touwen (1990). 
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when British military and diplomatic pressure eventually enforced a 
formal prohibition of the slave trade by sea in 1873 (Sheriff 1988, p. 
133). As a result, the hinterland of Mozambique was entrenched in 
the Atlantic slave trade up to the 1850s, but it also supplied slaves to 
Madagascar, the Comoros, the Mascarenes, and further destinations 
in the Indian Ocean (Campbell 2004, 2008). Compared to the 
estimates of the Atlantic slave trade, the figures for the export of 
slaves into the Persian Gulf and South Asia remain mere guesstimates, 
but there appears to be a consensus that this trade reached its peak 
between 1850 and 1873, and that about half of the guesstimated 1.6 
million slaves being taken out of East and Central Africa during the 
nineteenth century were retained on the East African coast (Austen 
1988, p. 41; Lovejoy 2011, p. 156). 
The Eastbound slave trades were complemented by the export 
of ivory from the interior, as well as cloves produced with slave labor 
at the coast. Oil seeds (e.g., sesame) and copal were also exported, 
albeit in very small quantities (Clarence-Smith 1989; Sheriff 1987; 
Cooper 1974). Yet, the size of the commodity trade remained much 
lower in East than in West Africa throughout the nineteenth century. 
In the 1890s, imports from British East Africa were valued at a little 
over three million pounds, whereas imports from British West Africa 
totaled nearly 25 million pounds.15 These figures reflect the fact that 
the “cash-crop revolution” in East Africa, which included tobacco, 
cotton, sesame, flax, coffee, and tea, did not really start until after 
1900, when railways removed the transportation bottlenecks for 
perishable bulk commodities (Tosh 1980; Jedwab and Moradi 2016). 
Given the much stronger orientation of European trade on the African 
Atlantic, it is not surprising that European colonization of the deeper 
African interior started in West Africa, which was wealthier and more 
densely populated (Frankema and van Waijenburg 2012).  
 
A NEW DATABASE OF AFRICAN TRADE 
 
In the 1970s and 1980s, a series of pioneering studies 
documented the transition from slave to commodity exports (Forbes-
Munro 1976; Hanson 1980; Liesegang, Pasch, and Jones 1986; Eltis 
and Jennings 1988; Law 1993). However, these studies focused on 
parts of the nineteenth century or on trade in a few commodities, with 
none based on a comprehensive dataset of African trade for the entire 
nineteenth century. More recent work on African terms of trade has 
either focused on a single commodity, or considered post-1870 trade 
developments, including terms-of-trade analyses but for different 
analytical purposes (Deaton 1999; Allen 2011; Prados de la Escosura 
                                                          
15 Data obtained from the Statistical Abstract for the Several Colonial and Other Possession 
of the United Kingdom (1890–1899). 
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2012).16 Within the limitations of the available historical sources, our 
dataset has a larger spatial and temporal coverage and includes more 
product detail. We gathered our data from primary trade accounts and 
merged these with several existing series to produce annual time-
series of export volumes, export values, commodity export prices, 
import prices, and NBTT series. Our data cover more than 50 products 
including foodstuffs, cash-crops, forest products, metal ores, and 
minerals. The series were built up from spatially disaggregated 
sources and were weighted up to aggregate trade and price series. This 
allows us to analyze aggregate African trade developments in a global 
perspective and it also allows us to explore trends at the regional or 
product level.17  
For 1808–1829 most of our observations are drawn from 
British trade with West and South Africa listed in the handwritten 
British Customs Records. We drew French trade with West Africa 
from the French import statistics. For the African islands, our pre-
1830 series focus on sugar, which covered more than 80 percent of 
the islands’ export value, and for the East African coast our data up to 
1890 are based on ivory exports derived from the work of Abdul 
Sheriff (1986). For the post-1830 era our dataset covers exports and 
imports of nineteen areas in sub-Saharan Africa for which we 
obtained price information at the African coast. Post-1830 British data 
is drawn from the Colonial Blue Books, the Statistical Abstract for the 
Several Colonial and Other Possession of the United Kingdom and 
the Statistical Abstract for the United Kingdom. Post-1830 French 
data comes primarily from the Tableau General du Commerce de la 
France avec ses Colonies et les Puissances etrangeres. We identify 
these regions with the names given to the “colonies” that emerged 
during the late nineteenth century.  
In West Africa, we distinguish the Gold Coast (present-day 
Ghana), Gambia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, the French West African 
Coast (covering Mauritania, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Togo, and Benin), 
and Senegal. In East Africa, we distinguish Northern Rhodesia 
(Zambia), Nyasaland (Malawi), Kenya and the Uganda Protectorate, 
Somaliland (Somalia), Tanganyika (Tanzania), and Zanzibar. The 
African islands include Madagascar, Mauritius, and Reunion. For 
South Africa, we have trade data for the Cape Colony, Natal (merged 
into the Union of South Africa in 1910), and Southern Rhodesia 
(Zimbabwe). For North Africa, we included data from Egypt drawn 
                                                          
16 Deaton (1999) focuses on the twentieth century; Allen (2011) offers prices of palm-oil 
(1817–1997) and cocoa (1854–1994) relative to cotton cloth, even though he seems to be 
unaware that cocoa played no role in African exports until after the scramble; Prados de la 
Escosura (2012) uses post-1870 export price series to estimate GDP series from Hanson 
(1980) and Bairoch and Etemad (1985). But in this 2012 study he does not analyse African 
trade. 
17 The full dataset and source description is available at: www.aehnetwork.org/data-
research/african-commodity-trade-database/ 
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from the work of Laura Panza and Jeffrey Williamson (2015). We 
also gathered data for Portuguese Africa and the Congo Free State 
(later Belgian Congo), but we focus here on the areas that came under 
British and French control, which constituted more than 90 percent of 
total continental commodity trade throughout the nineteenth century.   
We constructed export price indices using annual prices 
quoted at African ports for 1830–1939 and extrapolated these indices 
backwards to 1808 using American wholesale prices, converted into 
British pounds using official exchange rates (Bezanson, Gray, and 
Hussey 1937; Officer 2015).18 Where several commodity prices were 
available from different areas, we weighted each by its volume share 
in total African exports. French prices were converted to British 
pounds using quoted exchange rates (Mitchell 1988, pp. 700–703). 
Where African price data were missing for the 1830–1939 period, we 
interpolated the commodity price indices based on the British 
wholesale prices trends (Sauerbeck 1886–1951).  
 Figure 2 presents the growth in exports of the four most 
important commodities in nineteenth century sub-Saharan Africa 
from 1850 to 1910, excluding South Africa. Palm oil was the key 
commodity in the first half of the nineteenth century. Palm oil was 
used as a machine lubricant (including the railways), as an ingredient 
in soap production, and as an edible oil in food processing industries. 
After 1850 gum and especially groundnuts became more important 
and were the two principal export items from the Senegambia area 
(present-day Senegal and the Gambia). Groundnuts were particularly 
valued as a source of protein-rich vegetable oil, finding its way mainly 
into European food industries. Gum was used for all sorts of industrial 
purposes, but was especially valued for its adhesive qualities and 
demanded by textile, food, and chemical industries. After 1880, a 
number of other export commodities gained ground such as rubber, 
cocoa, and cotton.  
 Sub-Saharan Africa was a small player in world trade, even 
though its share of world trade increased in the century between 1850 
                                                          
18 We based our index on export prices quoted at African ports instead of prices quoted on 
European markets for three reasons. Firstly, not all the key African export commodities are 
listed in the British or French wholesale price index series. Secondly, some of the products 
that are listed in the African sources may be of a different quality or have certain 
characteristics that distinguish them from the commodities listed on the European markets; 
e.g., wood. Thirdly, prices observed at the African coast may differ from those quoted in 
London or Paris. Comparing price levels for four key African commodities (palm oil, rubber, 
hides, and raw cotton) reveals a strong correlation between coastal and London prices for all 
commodities (between 0.73 and 0.94), except for palm oil (0.36). Comparing annual growth 
rates reveals a strong correlation for the coastal and London price series for hides and cotton 
(0.86 and 0.72, resp.), but not for rubber and palm oil (0.37 and 0.39). A cointegration test 
finds that the London and African time series for palm oil are cointegrated, as is the case for 
hides and cotton. The null hypothesis of no cointegration for rubber, however, cannot be 
rejected at the standard 5 percent significance level. The reasons why price trends diverge for 
some years or periods are difficult to determine and beyond the scope of this article. However, 
for the derivation of African NBTT it is crucial to base prices for African export commodities 
on unit values observed at the African coast. 
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and 1950. This does not imply, however, that all African export 
commodities were insignificant. In the decades before the scramble, 
West Africa was the world’s leading supplier of palm-oil, palm 
kernels, gum, and groundnuts. The Gold Coast became market leader 
in cocoa beans in 1911 and maintained this status to the late 1970s 
(Austin 2005, p. 2). East African ivory dominated world markets in 
the nineteenth century and Central African exports of wild rubber 
were significant before Southeast Asian plantations took over in the 
1910s (Clarence-Smith 2013, p. 193). Especially palm-oil, gum, and 
groundnuts from West Africa and rubber from the Congo basin were 
highly valued industrial inputs. European merchants who had invested 
in these trades were eager to control and expand the trade.19 From the 
1840s to the 1880s, the composition of British and French imports 
also shifted. British merchant companies concentrated increasingly on 
the palm-oil trade with the Gold Coast and Southern Nigeria, while 
French companies invested increasingly in the gum and groundnut 
trades in the Senegambia area from about 1850 onwards. 
Figure 3 presents the trend in total French and British imports 
from West Africa. While both increased, their timing and magnitude 
differed. In the 1830s and 1840s the average annual value of British 
imports from West Africa was distinctively larger. However, around 
1850 the total value of French imports from West Africa overtook the 
total value of British imports. Between 1850 and 1880 the growth was 
more or less comparable, but these figures hide the important fact that 
around 1880 the per capita exports from Senegal were much higher 
than from Nigeria, even exceeding a ratio of 10:1, since the former 
area was far less densely populated than the latter.20 Finally, Figure 3 
shows that during the scramble exports from French West Africa fell 
much more than did exports from British West Africa. This drop was 
mainly caused by declining volumes, rather than by declining prices. 
It shows that the military campaigns of the French had a much more 
disruptive effect on trade, which is consistent with the generally 
accepted view that the French had to fight longer and harder to 
“pacify” Africans (Boahen and M’Baye Gueye 1985).  
In Tables 1A and 1B we present the share of African colonies 
in total exports to Britain and France along with trade from other 
colonies from 1860–1939. While continuing to be dominated by 
India, Ceylon, and Southeast Asia, the African share of exports to 
Britain grew from seven to 25 percent over the period. Table 1A 
shows that African commodity trade to Britain was dominated by 
                                                          
19 See for a detailed discussion of African and European interests in the Nigerian palm-oil 
trade Dike (1956). See for French trade Kanya-Forstner (1988). See for a general overview 
Newbury (1988). 
20 For these calculations, we used the official exchange rates of the gold standard regime, in 
which one British Pound equaled 26 French Francs. We took population estimates for Nigeria 
and Senegal from Frankema and Jerven (2014). 
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South Africa and Mauritius up to the 1880s, but that the West and East 
African shares increased from 1890 and 1910, respectively. In Table 
1B we show that African exports to France dominated imperial trade 
in a similar way as Indian exports dominated British imperial trade. 
Africa was central to French colonial imports. North Africa, and 
Algeria in particular, made up the bulk of this trade ranging between 
33 and 64 percent. Still, the share of West African exports to France 
was substantial as well, hovering around 10 to 15 percent in the 
decades before the scramble. Following the decline of the French 
Caribbean trade during the late nineteenth century, the share of West 
African exports to France was only matched by exports from 
Indochina. We excluded exports from the British dominions such as 
Australia and Canada, but if these were added, the difference in the 
relative weight of African exports in British and French imperial trade 
would appear even larger. Indeed, French trade on the Senegambia 
had a very different standing in the context of empire than British 
trade on the Gold Coast or the Niger delta. 
 
THE COMMODITY PRICE BOOM OF 1835–1885 
 
We now bring the “commercial transition” in sharper focus by 
exploring the timing as well as the comparative magnitude of sub-
Saharan Africa’s nineteenth century commodity price boom. We 
calculate the NBTT as the ratio of the weighted average of all major 
commodity export prices to commodity import prices, and use this 
information to calculate annual average growth rates of the 
purchasing power of African exports.  
 To obtain an aggregate export price index for each 
area/colony, the country’s commodity prices were weighted using its 
export mix. These export weights were changed at approximately 20-
year intervals to capture long-run shifts in export composition.21 The 
                                                          
21 Modern index-number literature emphasizes that weights need to be updated at regular 
intervals to reflect changing expenditure patterns and incorporate new products in the 
weighting baskets (Diewert 2014). Setting fixed, time-invariant weights will introduce a 
sizable bias at any given point in time. Commonly, long indices are constructed using a 
procedure called chaining, where aggregate price indices are calculated for shorter, partly 
overlapping sub-periods which are subsequently joined together by rescaling them to make 
the values equal in the overlapping years. However, if there are considerable fluctuations in 
the prices and quantities in the intervening periods, chaining may both increase the index 
number spread and even distort the measure of the overall change between the first and last 
periods. A solution is to reduce the frequency of chaining and thus lengthen the sub-periods. 
This can smooth out temporary shocks to prices or quantities and compensate for 
measurement error in the weights. These issues are particularly relevant for our NBTT series 
which spans a long time-period, sees the introduction of various new export and import 
commodities, exhibits a fair amount of volatility in both the prices and quantities for those 
commodities, and inevitably suffers from some measurement error. We adopt a chaining 
procedure, setting the chain length at 20 years, and averaging the weights over each sub-
period. Our methodology not only matches the standard practice in the historical trade 
literature (Blattman, Hwang, and Williamson 2007; Williamson 2011), it also closely mirrors 
the methodology currently applied by the World Bank and the IMF (2009). A robustness 
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commodity specific quantity information for 1830–1939 is based on 
the same sources as the export price data described earlier. Country-
specific export price indices were aggregated to obtain regional series, 
matching the five regions described in the previous section. The 
aggregate indices were constructed using area/colony nominal export 
shares. These weights were also changed at 20-year intervals to 
capture the shift in each area’s contribution to the value of total 
African exports. Regional specific terms of trade were derived by 
dividing the export price indices by a common import price index 
(Mitchell 1988, pp. 526–28), to capture change in the prices for the 
primary British manufactures shipped abroad. The use of a common 
African import price index implies that we do not take differences in 
the import mix of individual African colonies into account. We 
conducted a sensitivity analyses based on the quantity and prices of 
imported goods from the United Kingdom into Africa (observed at the 
African coast) to check for possible biases caused by compositional 
effects. In addition, we compared a price index of British commodities 
to an index of French commodities being traded with the rest of the 
world. The results are shown in the Online Appendix and indicate that 
the British index by Brian Mitchell (1988) appears to be a good proxy 
for the price development of imported goods into Africa. 
 Figure 4 shows the evolution of the NBTT index for British 
and French West Africa combined. The NBTT rose modestly up to 
the mid-1830s, but increased rapidly from then to the mid-1880s. The 
secular commodity price and terms of trade boom is consistent with 
other tropical commodity exporting countries in Latin America and 
Southeast Asia: from 1835 to 1885 their terms of trade doubled, or 
increased at an annual rate of 1.9 percent, which was larger than per 
capita income growth in the poor periphery, and even greater than per 
capita income growth in the United Kingdom (1.2 percent per annum, 
1820–1870), as estimated by Angus Maddison (1995, p. 23). 
However, as also shown in Figure 4, the fall from the peak in the mid-
1880s to 1939 eroded all the gains which producers and traders in 
West Africa had experienced from the early 1800s onwards. This 
terms-of-trade decline that has received far more attention than the 
huge boom that preceded it (Prebisch 1950; Singer 1950; Lewis 
1978).  
These new NBTT estimates for English colonial trade differ 
distinctively from the gross barter terms of trade (GBTT) series 
                                                          
check of our NBTT index for West Africa (WA) between 1808 and 1884 reveals that 
alternative choices of chain lengths do not fundamentally alter our findings. Setting the chain 
length as high as 50 years or as low as two years yields estimates of average annual NBTT 
growth ranging from 1.51 to 1.87 percent. Our preferred estimate of 1.65, based on 20-year 
intervals, sits comfortable in the middle of this range. Setting the chain length to one, thus 
updating weights every year, results in an average annual growth rate of NBTT for WA 
between 1808 and 1884 of 2.38 percent. This substantially higher growth rate is likely the 
result of chain drift. 
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offered by Eltis and Jennings (1988, p. 943), as shown in Table 2.22 
Although both indices confirm that the African terms of trade 
improved over the course of the early nineteenth century, the rate of 
growth in the two series show different patterns. We observe a take-
off in the 1830s peaking in the mid-1880s (as shown in Figure 4). The 
Eltis and Jennings series suggested that the African terms of trade 
more than doubled, translating into an annual rate of growth of 2.1 
percent between the second half of the 1810s and the early 1850s. Our 
estimates indicate the terms of trade to have grown by a little under 
1.3 percent per annum between 1816 and 1853, nearly 40 percent less 
than their estimate. 
Although Eltis and Jennings (1988, p. 942) were unable to link 
their early nineteenth century estimates to the post-1853 period, they 
contended that the terms of trade rise “probably continued until the 
last third of the nineteenth century, when a sharp reversal occurred.” 
Here they echo Hopkins’ (1973, p. 133) claim, based on his analysis 
of nominal palm-oil prices, that “the barter terms of trade moved 
decisively against primary producers” in the third quarter of the 
nineteenth century. Our estimates show that the aggregate terms of 
trade peaked later, in the middle of the fourth quarter of the nineteenth 
century, because the terms of trade of other West African export 
commodities such as gum and groundnuts continued to rise up to the 
mid-1880s. 
There are three reasons why the NBTT series are to be 
preferred over GBTT series to capture long-term changes in relative 
prices (Obstfeld and Rogoff 1996). First, the GBTT series measure 
relative changes in the volume of exports over the volume of imports. 
This is a good measure of purchasing power only if the current and 
capital accounts are balanced, as a trade deficit funded by 
international loans or unrequited transfers would cause the GBTT to 
be more favorable than the NBTT. However, these assumptions were 
clearly violated in nineteenth-century Africa when volatile trade gaps 
were cleared by sizable flows of gold and capital.23 The NBTT 
measure does not assume that the trade balance is zero. Second, for 
aggregated trends the GBTT requires a set of prices for a given base 
year to convert the nominal value of all goods and services traded into 
real values. Eltis and Jennings relied on the official values reported in 
the British customs ledgers, which were based on late seventeenth-
century prices. These official values are not representative for the 
trade flows observed in the nineteenth century, which contained 
several new export products that had seen sizable increases in their 
traded volume accompanied by falling prices. 
                                                          
22 The GBTT is the ratio between the volume of a country’s imports and exports, whereas the 
NBTT is the ratio between the prices of a country’s imports and exports. 
23 The Statistical Abstract for the Several Colonial and Other Possession of the United 
Kingdom provides a detailed summary of capital flows. 
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Third, aggregating together quantities of all goods imported 
and exported does not allow one to detect the impact of a change in 
volume of a single commodity on the terms of trade. NBTT estimates 
allow us to focus strictly on commodities, to single out the effect of 
individual goods on the overall terms-of-trade trend, and to reweight 
the index at 20-year intervals to more adequately reflect the changing 
export mix over time. Finally, since Eltis and Jennings did not extend 
their GBTT index into the post-1850 era, they missed a vital part of 
the commercial transition in West Africa and, indeed, the full extent 
of the African terms of trade boom of 1835–1885. 
The use of the NBTT measure allows us to disentangle the 
effects of changes in import prices and in export prices as well as the 
growth in the volume of exports on the purchasing power of African 
exports. Table 3 illustrates this for West Africa. In the period up to 
1885, during the height of the terms-of-trade boom, export price 
growth enhanced the purchasing power of exports. Between 1853 and 
1885, export volumes rose at an annual rate of 2.23 and 3.14 percent 
for the French and British possessions, respectively, while the 
purchasing power of exports (in other words the real value of imports 
received in exchange for African exports) rose at one-and-a-half or 
double those rates: 4.96 and 4.65 percent respectively. Contrary to the 
views of Hopkins and Eltis and Jennings, the real revenues from 
West-African exports did not contract during the third quarter of the 
nineteenth century, but rose at an impressive rate. The change in the 
price for commodity exports (relative to the price of imports) 
accounted for more than half of the increase in the purchasing power 
of exports for French West Africa and nearly a third for British West 
Africa. 
After 1885, the terms of trade went into sharp decline, 
reflecting the fact that export prices rose more slowly than the prices 
for imported goods. The terms-of-trade decline notwithstanding, the 
purchasing power of exports still rose between 1885 and 1929. This 
was driven exclusively by a pronounced increase in the export volume 
for both British and French West Africa. Later, we discuss why the 
export boom continued during the colonial era, despite the sharp 
decline in the African terms of trade. 
 
AFRICA’S COMMODITY PRICE BOOM IN GLOBAL 
PERSPECTIVE 
 
What did West Africa’s commodity price boom look like in a 
global comparative perspective? First, we compare the West African 
NBBT trends with four other African sub-regions, which are all 
characterized by rather different export packages: East Africa, the 
African islands, the Cape Colony (later South Africa), and Egypt. 
Then, we compare the West African NBTT trend with the European 
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Periphery (Italy, Portugal, Russia, Spain), the Middle East (Egypt, 
Ottoman Turkey, Levant), Latin America (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Cuba, Mexico, Venezuela), South Asia (Ceylon, India), and Southeast 
Asia (Indonesia, Malaya, the Philippines, Siam).24  
 Figure 5 shows that the NBTT in other parts of Africa also 
rose impressively during the nineteenth century, but there are some 
major differences. Firstly, relative prices of South African 
commodities such as wool, wine, and hides (diamonds and gold are 
excluded) did not increase as much as the relative prices of tropical 
commodities. The boom in East Africa was driven exclusively by 
ivory prices. In Egypt, the terms of trade were driven by cotton prices 
which peaked in the 1860s when world supplies dwindled because of 
the American civil war. Finally, while the rise of the NBTT up to the 
1860s was slower in the African islands—where sugar dominated—
its peak in the early 1880s was similar to West Africa. 
 The comparison of West Africa and Africa more generally 
with other commodity exporters is described in Figure 6. We show 
the relationships for South Asia, the European periphery, the Middle 
East, Latin America, and Southeast Asia. South Asia—dominated by 
India—had a shorter and a weaker nineteenth century terms-of-trade 
boom than West Africa with the South Asian terms of trade peaking 
in 1861, a full quarter of a century before the West African peak. 
Annual average growth of South Asia’s NBTT from its trough to 
boom was just half of what we observe for sub-Saharan Africa (see 
Table 4). Over the full nineteenth century up to 1885–1890 South Asia 
recorded no NBTT growth at all, whereas we find an annual average 
growth of 1.73 for sub-Saharan Africa. Indeed, all the growth in 
India’s terms of trade took place up to the 1820s; after that decade, 
India exhibited great volatility, but no secular growth in its terms of 
trade.25 The European periphery and the Middle East both had a 
steeper boom-to-peak than West Africa, but, like South Asia, they 
were shorter, peaking in 1855 and 1857. The terms of trade for Latin 
America and Southeast Asia were more like West Africa, which is 
explained by the larger similarities in the export packages of these 
three regions.  
In Table 4 we convert this visual accounting into annual 
growth rates. From the late eighteenth century to 1860, the 
commodity-exporting “periphery” experienced one of the biggest 
terms of trade booms in world history. The unweighted annual 
average growth rate of the five regions mentioned earlier—excluding 
Africa and East Asia—was 1.43 percent per annum. The figure for 
West Africa was even higher, 1.65 percent per annum. West Africa 
                                                          
24 This section draws on Williamson (2011, Chapter 3). 
25 This is an especially ironic finding given that the literature on nineteenth century de-
industrialization in British India has been the most copious and contentious by far. See Roy 
(2002); Clingingsmith and Williamson (2008). 
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also enjoyed its boom a couple of decades longer than the average 
poor commodity exporter. Summing up, Hopkins and Eltis and 
Jennings were surely correct about the rising terms of trade in West 
Africa, but our new NBTT estimates reveal that the boom was 
stronger and more prolonged than they have envisaged. 
 
AN ECONOMIC RATIONALE FOR THE WEST AFRICAN 
SCRAMBLE? 
 
This new evidence documenting the evolution of nineteenth 
century Afro-European trade allows us to re-assess the economic 
rationale for the West African scramble. The relevant historical 
counterfactual has two elements: would the case for building a railway 
into the West African interior have been politically defensible if the 
West African share in French imperial trade would have been as small 
as it was in British imperial trade? And second, would their ambitions 
to invade have gathered sufficient political support without the 
commodity price boom that started around the mid-1830s and 
continued up to the mid-1880s, a price boom that contributed more 
than half of the growth in French imports from West Africa? While 
these counterfactuals are impossible to test in a formal way, we will 
argue here that the economic rationale for the scramble did not only 
appear much stronger in the 1880s than in the 1830s, but also that 
West Africa had a different place in French than in British visions of 
empire. 
 During the mid-nineteenth century, the British government 
took the view that free trade should be promoted without interference 
in indigenous affairs. Especially with regard to Africa, the Treasury 
did everything to block increasing expenses on colonial settlements 
(Hargreaves 1963). In an earlier study, John Gallagher and Ronald 
Robinson (1953, p. 4) observed that formal policies and historical 
practices diverged, noting that British warships in Canton 
(Guangzhou) and the establishment of formal control over major parts 
of India (the Raj) did not demonstrate a “reluctance” to the expansion 
of empire, and were motivated by securing British mercantile and 
capitalist interests. With respect to Africa, they stated that “the West 
Africa Committee of 1865 made a strong and much quoted case for 
giving up all but one of the West African settlements, but even as they 
sat these settlements were being extended.”26 Gallagher and Robinson 
argued that the British only opted for the expansion of “formal 
empire” when their options of informal control (via voluntary or 
enforced free trade treaties) were undermined by unreliable local 
trading partners or by European contenders. In later work they went a 
                                                          
26 Dike (1956, p. 181) also noted how the plea of the West Africa Committee for retreat, was 
inconsistent with increasing British encroachment in the Niger delta in the 1860s. 
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step further, arguing that the economic rationale for the African 
scramble was to be found in Asia (Robinson and Gallagher 1961).  
 Hopkins noted, however, that the British and French did set 
out to secure those places where they had built up the strongest 
commercial relations: the French in the Senegambia area, the British 
around the Volta and Niger basins. He reasoned that European 
demand for industrial inputs had driven up the price of West African 
export commodities, but that the price of palm-oil, and many 
agricultural commodities, had started to fall after the 1860s as a result 
of the “great depression” of 1873–1895, so that the timing of the price 
boom did not align with the timing of the scramble. He contended that 
falling African commodity prices provoked intra-African conflicts 
over shrinking export revenues, induced extra tolls and tariffs in 
compensation, and that the undermining of free trade by Africans 
motivated European intervention (Hopkins 1972, p. 586). 
 The Hopkins thesis has been criticized by Ade Ajayi and 
Ralph Austen (1972, pp. 304–306) who pointed out that the Yoruba 
wars in Nigeria that Hopkins had referred to were not primarily 
motivated by considerations of declining external trade revenues, 
since it accounted for only a small portion of the economic surpluses 
that were generated in the domestic economy. Moreover, Ajayi and 
Austen contended that the palm-oil trade in Southern Nigeria was not 
the main prize of the scramble. Even though the British secured 
territorial control over Lagos in 1861, they argued that Europeans 
were primarily concerned with capturing the external and internal 
trade flows of the major Savannah empires in the middle Niger delta.  
Whereas this was certainly true for the French (see later), the 
British concentrated their efforts on the annexation of Lagos. Hopkins 
(1980) elaborated his earlier argument by noting that the impetus 
given to the palm-oil trade by regular steamship connections also 
required changes in property right regimes, especially with respect to 
marketable ownership rights over land. The increasing reliance on 
mercantile credit in societies with non-convertible currencies (in other 
words cowries) stimulated demand for securities by the European 
trading community. Such changes in property rights regimes required 
the presence of a reliable government capable of creating institutions 
for land transfers and protecting land rights. Although the call of the 
merchant community for the annexation of Lagos cannot explain the 
West African scramble as such, the relationship between land rights 
and territorial control became of imminent importance in later plans 
for the construction of railways. 
 The chronology is important. According to Colin Newbury 
and Alexander Kanya-Forstner (1969, p. 255), French intentions to 
extend their territorial control over the Western Sudan were already a 
serious political consideration in the 1850s, and were inspired by the 
successful conquest of Algeria in the 1830s. The original idea, put 
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forward by Senegal’s governor Louis Faidherbe, was to create a trans-
Saharan union connecting the Middle Niger delta and the major inland 
cities such as Bamako, Gao, and Timbuktu, into a triangular network 
with Algeria to the North, and the Senegambia to the West. Given the 
growing importance of both areas in French imperial trade, a railway 
connection with the Savannah empires was perceived as a logical 
extension of the French African Empire. In the mid-1860s these plans 
were put on hold, as France was distracted by overseas wars in 
Mexico and Indochina (Newbury and Kanya-Forstner 1969, p. 256). 
However, the humiliating defeat in the Franco-Prussian war in 1870–
1871, as well as the continuing expansion of the British overseas 
empire, kept fueling a political desire to reinvigorate national 
grandeur (Cain and Hopkins 1993, pp. 329–31).  
 Meanwhile, Bordeaux merchants trading in Senegambia, 
enthralled railway engineers and colonial governors kept lobbying for 
imperial expansion in West Africa. While the costs of invading West 
Africa appeared insurmountable in the 1850s and 1860s, the French 
government did approve new funds for strengthening colonial control 
over the Senegambia area. The reconstruction of the run-down fort at 
Podor and the construction of a new fort at Médine in the 1850s, were 
motivated by the need to crush Moorish control over the expanding 
gum trade (Newbury and Kanya-Forstner 1969, pp. 254, 257). The 
rapid growth of the groundnut trade in the 1860s commanded the 
erection of new forts at Boffa, Boké, and Benty (Hargreaves 1963, pp. 
129–36). At the same time, colonial investments at the Slave and 
Ivory coasts (present-day Benin and Côte d’Ivoire), and in particular 
the French stronghold in Porto-Novo, were scaled back. The prospects 
of expanding trade with the Senegambia, and contracting trade further 
South, thus played a key role in the re-allocation of France’s imperial 
budgets. 
 The fascinating reconstruction of the political chronology by 
Newbury and Kanya-Forstner (1969, p. 257) reveals that the 
definitive decision by the French government to invade the West 
African interior was prepared in 1876–1879, that is before the British 
occupation of Egypt in 1882. The economic context in which this 
decision was made was one of depressed trade in Europe, but growing 
trade with West Africa (see Figure 2). Although there was a price 
collapse for gum and groundnuts in 1877, with severe fiscal 
repercussions, this depression was short lived. Figure 7 shows that 
whereas the relative price of palm oil fell, that for gum and groundnuts 
continued to rise up to the mid-1880s. These trade developments 
fueled ex-ante optimism on the economic prospects of penetrating the 
Senegalese hinterland, even though the envisaged wealth of the 
Savanah empires, and especially its gold deposits, were exaggerated 
to mythical proportions (Newbury and Kanya-Forstner 1969, p. 261; 
Brunschwig 1960, pp. 23–28). 
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TRADE AFTER THE SCRAMBLE 
 
While a more in-depth analysis of trade during and after the 
scramble warrants a separate study, we conclude by making three 
general observations. First, although African commodity exports 
increased throughout the nineteenth century, the price boom was the 
defining feature of the 1835–1885 period, with export volumes rising 
as a supply response. What followed was different. The export boom 
continued, but it coincided with a prolonged fall in commodity prices. 
That is, commodity exports now grew for reasons other than a supply 
response to favorable world prices. As shown in Table 3, the post-
scramble acceleration of export growth was entirely caused by 
volume growth. This growth in export quantities was facilitated by 
railroads. European territorial control paved the way for railway 
investments unlocking the export potential of the African interior. 
Most of these railways were constructed and completed in the four 
decades following 1890. Although this export boom involved some 
diversification into a wider range of tropical commodities and 
minerals, the overall composition of African exports remained 
overwhelmingly based on primary commodities. It should also be 
noted that while sea-bound exports from sub-Saharan Africa to 
Europe increased exponentially after the scramble, the imposition of 
colonial borders often disrupted existing intra-African trade 
relations.27  
This deepening of specialization in primary commodities 
during an era of almost continuously worsening terms of trade raises 
another question. Why did Africa not escape this commodity export 
trap after world markets soured? We will not try to offer a 
comprehensive answer to this question here, except to note that an 
explanation must come from two sources: first, the African 
endowment of abundant land with scarce capital, labor and skills, an 
endowment that heavily favored land-extensive agriculture, and 
mining; and second, colonial policies designed to support 
specialization in primary commodities (Austin, Frankema, and Jerven 
2017). Any attempt to sort out these two forces will have to deal with 
the evidence in Figure 8, showing that export growth was slower 
before the 1880s, when prices boomed, and faster after the 1890s, 
when prices slumped, not only to the detriment of African producers, 
but also to European investors and plantation-owners. It is also worth 
noting that the price slump was larger in French Africa than in British 
Africa, partly because of the declining value of the French Franc after 
abandoning the gold standard. 
Furthermore, the move towards trade liberalization that 
occurred in Europe during the mid-nineteenth century was 
                                                          
27 See for the case of French Guinée (Goerg 1980).  
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implemented in colonial Africa right at the time that it was starting to 
reverse in Europe. Colonial governments implemented modest tariff 
policies, mainly motivated by the need to raise government revenues, 
not by the desire to protect local producers. Colonial governments 
promoted the free flow of goods into and out of their territories, and 
relied on large-scale programs of forced labor to build the necessary 
infrastructure (Frankema and van Waijenburg 2014). Colonial 
governments imposed ad valorem import duties around 5 to 10 
percent and left exports largely untaxed.  
Liberal trade policies came under pressure in the 1930s, when 
soaring budget deficits forced colonial governments to rethink their 
models of colonial economic development. Marketing boards were 
established to strengthen the control of colonial governments on the 
main export sectors via price controls and monopsonies. The 
marketing boards were initially intended to stabilize volatile 
commodity prices and African farm incomes, but the revenues derived 
from the increasing margins between marketing board purchase prices 
and world market prices were kept in metropolitan funds and were not 
channeled back directly into the development of local agriculture 
(Meredith 1986; Havinden and Meredith 1995). In the settler colonies, 
where government interventions in markets for labor and land had 
been more pervasive and biased against African smallholders, 
colonial policy reforms removed some of the restrictions in the hope 
to revive commodity exports (Frankema, Green, and Hillbon 2016).  
 Finally, thanks to the commodity export boom Africa’s share 
of world trade kept rising to about 5 percent in 1950. This share was 
maintained during the late colonial era up to the early 1970s. The rise 
itself is not surprising. Africa was the last major world region to be 
unlocked by railways. Moreover, if the external slave trade had 
crowded out the development of commodity exports, the slave trades 
must also have retarded the integration of Africa into world 
commodity markets. Yet, globalization-induced specialization in 
primary products also meant greater price volatility, and this 
compounded the divergence in growth rates during the twentieth 
century. African export prices collapsed again during the 1970s and 
only started recovering around 1995–2000. How long Africa’s 
commodity boom will last this time is difficult to say, but one thing 
seems clear: the recent rise in African terms of trade is far more 
modest than the 1835–1885 boom. 
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APPENDIX FIGURE 1  
COLONIAL BORDERS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA, CIRCA 1914 
 
Source: author’s own. 
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FIGURE 1 
VALUE OF SLAVES AND COMMODITIES FROM WEST AFRICA, 1700–1913 
 
Notes: Value of slaves and commodities in nominal values converted to British Pounds.  
Sources: 1808–1913 commodities see notes to Figure 3 and text. 1737–1807 commodity values based on the 
share of commodities in the total value of trade from West Africa (Dalrymple-Smith and Woltjer 2016). Value 
of slave trade for West Africa based on slave embarkations from the Transatlantic Slave Trade Database (Eltis 
and Richardson 2008) and slave prices from Richardson (1991) and Lovejoy and Richardson (1995). 
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FIGURE 2 
KEY COMMODITY EXPORTS FROM WEST AND EAST AFRICA, 1825–1900 
 
Notes: Exports of key African commodities into France and Great Britain respectively. Nuts and Kernels includes Palm Kernels. 
British possessions’ exports of ivory include ivory re-exported via India. The vertical axis for Palm Oil and Nuts and Kernels 
shows the quantity in thousands of metric tons, whereas the quantity of Ivory and Gum and Resins is given in metric tons. 
Sources: France, Tableau General du Commerce (1827–1901); Great Britain, British Customs Records (1825–1850), Annual 
Statement of the Trade and Navigation (1855–1901), Sheriff (1986). 
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FIGURE 3 
TOTAL EXPORTS FROM BRITISH AND FRENCH WEST AFRICA, 1808–1939 
 
Notes: Total exports in nominal values converted to British Pounds. Pre-1850 data extrapolated based on the 
aggregate nominal export value of ivory, nuts and kernels, gum and resins, palm oil, wax, pepper and hides. 
Sources: See text.  
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Figure 4 
NET BARTER TERMS OF TRADE WEST AFRICA, 1808–1939 (1900=100) 
 
Notes: Smoothed trend derived using Hodrick-Prescott filter, with a smoothing factor set to 100. 
Sources: See text. 
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FIGURE 5 
REGIONAL NET BARTER TERMS OF TRADE AFRICA, 1784–1939 (1900=100) 
 
Notes: Smoothed trend derived using Hodrick-Prescott filter, with a smoothing factor set to 100. The scale on the 
vertical axis differs between the sub-plots. 
Sources: See text. 
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FIGURE 6 
TERMS OF TRADE WEST AFRICA AND THE REST OF THE POOR COMMODITY-EXPORTING 
PERIPHERY, 1784–1913 
 
Notes: Smoothed trend derived using Hodrick-Prescott filter, with a smoothing factor set to 100. The scale on 
the vertical axis differs between the sub-plots. 
Sources: “Other periphery” from Williamson (2011). “West Africa” see text. 
Transition/Commodity Price Boom of 1835–1885 
 
7 
 
7 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 7 
COMMODITY SPECIFIC NET BARTER TERMS OF TRADE, WEST AFRICA 1808–1939 (1900=100) 
 
Notes: Smoothed trend derived using Hodrick-Prescott filter, with a smoothing factor set to 100. The scale on the vertical 
axis differs between the sub-plots. 
Sources: See text. 
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FIGURE 8 
TERMS OF TRADE AND VOLUME OF EXPORTS FROM WEST AFRICA, 1850–1939 (1900=100) 
 
Notes: Smoothed trend derived using Hodrick-Prescott filter, with a smoothing factor set to 100. British and French 
volumes are the quotient of the nominal export values and a price index of West-African exports. 
Sources: “Terms of Trade” see Figure 4; “Nominal Export values” see Figure 3; “Export Price Index” see text. 
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TABLE 2 
AFRICAN TERMS OF TRADE COMPARED, 1791–1853 (1850–1853=100) 
 Eltis and Jennings (GBTT) This Study (NBTT) 
1808–11  45.4 
1811–15  60.6 
1816–20 48.8 64.9 
1821–25 64.8 52.8 
1826–30 49.9 51.9 
1831–35 49.4 57.4 
1836–40 59.1 78.2 
1841–45 64.5 88.5 
1846–49 67.9 98.8 
1850–53 100.0 100.0 
Note: Gross and Net Barter Terms of Trade for West-Africa with England. 
Sources: Eltis and Jennings (1988, p. 943); see text. 
 
 
TABLE 1A 
SHARE OF EXPORTS OF BRITISH COLONIAL POSSESSIONS, 1860–1939 (Percent) 
Region 1860s 1870s 1880s 1890s 1900s 1910s 1920s 1930s 
India and Ceylon 72 69 70 60 60 55 59 53 
South-East Asia 11 12 12 15 15 16 20 22 
Caribbean 10 9 7 6 4 4 3 4 
Sub-Saharan Africa 7 10 11 18 21 25 18 21 
 West Africa 0.8 1.5 1.1 2.0 2.7 4.2 5.0 6.4 
 East Africa 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.4 1.2 1.6 4.2 
 Mauritius 3.2 3.4 2.7 1.9 1.2 1.2 1.0 0.7 
 South Africa 3.3 4.8 6.9 13.9 16.3 18.8 10.3 10.1 
Note: May not sum to total due to rounding. 
Source: Statistical Abstracts (various issues). 
TABLE 1B 
SHARE OF EXPORTS OF FRENCH COLONIAL POSSESSIONS, 1860–1939 (Percent) 
Region 1860s 1870s 1880s 1890s 1900s 1910s 1920s 1930s 
French India 3 2 5 2 3 2 0 0 
Indochina 0 1 1 5 10 12 11 10 
Caribbean 21 17 15 9 6 8 8 6 
Other possessions 11 11 11 10 9 5 5 1 
Africa 65 70 68 74 72 73 76 82 
 West Africa 13.0 9.4 15.4 7.6 10.3 11.7 15.1 11.6 
 East Africa 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.2 0.0 
 Madagascar and Reunion 18.5 10.2 6.1 4.6 4.2 6.7 8.3 7.0 
 North Africa 33.2 50.0 46.4 62.1 57.4 54.5 52.9 63.7 
Notes: “Other possessions” include St-Pierre-et-Miquelon, New Caledonia, and other French possessions in 
Oceania. “Madagascar and Reunion” also include Mayotte, Nossi-Be, and Ste-Marie-de-Madagascar. “Caribbean” 
also includes French Guiana. May not sum to total due to rounding. 
Sources: Tableau General du Commerce (1860–1867); Annuaire Statistique de la France (1878–1939). 
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TABLE 3  
DECOMPOSITION OF EXPORT GROWTH IN BRITISH AND FRENCH WEST AFRICA, 1853–1929 
 Annual Average Growth (Percent)  Contribution (Percent) 
 
Purchasing Power 
of Export 
Import 
Price Export Price 
Export 
Volume  Price Volume 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
British West Africa (£) 
1853–1885 4.65 –0.68 0.83 3.14  32 68 
1885–1929 5.49 1.32 0.46 6.36  –16 116 
French West Africa (Fr.) 
1853–1885 4.96 –1.06 1.67 2.23  55 45 
1885–1929 1.98 4.43 3.38 3.03  –53 153 
Notes: Growth rate in natural logs. The purchasing power of export in column (1) is the sum of columns (3) and 
(4) minus (2). The price contribution is the difference between columns (3) and (2) divided by (1). The volume 
contribution is the ratio of (4) and (1). May not sum to total due to rounding. 
Sources: British “Import Price” from Mitchell (1988); French “Import Price” from Mitchell (2007); British 
“Export Values” from Statistical Abstracts (various issues); French “Export Values” from Tableau General du 
Commerce (1860–1867); Annuaire Statistique de la France (1878–1939); British and French export price see 
text. 
 
TABLE 4 
TERMS OF TRADE IN THE PERIPHERY, AFRICAN GROWTH RATES IN PERSPECTIVE (PERCENT) 
Region Starting Year Peak Year 
Annual Growth 
Start to Peak 
(Percent) 
All periphery (ex. East Asia and Africa) 1796 1860 1.43 
 European periphery 1782 1855 2.43 
 Latin America 1782 1895 0.87 
 Middle East 1796 1857 1.68 
 South Asia 1782 1861 0.90 
 South-East Asia 1782 1896 1.42 
Sub-Saharan Africa (ex. South Africa) 1808 1885 1.73 
 West Africa 1808 1884 1.65 
 East Africa 1808 1887 2.23 
 Mauritius, Madagascar and Reunion 1808 1883 1.87 
South Africa 1816 1878 1.39 
Egypt 1803 1865 4.30 
Note: Growth rate in natural logs. 
Sources: “Other periphery” from Williamson (2011). “Africa” see text. 
 
 
